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This paper analyses the labour market effects of union wage bargaining for different
sequences of the employment choice and the wage bargain. The result that collective
bargaining decreases (firm-level) employment in a right-to-manage setting hinges on the
assumption that employment is chosen by the firm after the wage bargain ("ex-ante"
bargaining). Turning this sequence upside down ("ex-post" bargaining), the firm uses
employment choice as a strategic variable for the wage bargain. Employment will be equal to
the competitive case and wages will be higher. Although we strictly assume right-to-manage,
the timing of the bargain ensures an efficient contract.
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This paper analyses the labour market eﬀects of union wage bar-
gaining for diﬀerent sequences of the employment choice and the wage
bargain. The result that collective bargaining decreases (ﬁrm-level)
employment in a right-to-manage setting hinges on the assumption
that employment is chosen by the ﬁrm after the wage bargain (”ex-
ante” bargaining). Turning this sequence upside down (”ex-post”
bargaining), the ﬁrm uses employment choice as a strategic variable
for the wage bargain. Employment will be equal to the competitive
case and wages will be higher. Although we strictly assume right-to-
manage, the timing of the bargain ensures an eﬃcient contract.
1 Introduction
With union coverage rates of up to 95% (see CESifo DICE (2006)), the ma-
jority of employment contracts in Continental Europe are due to some form
of collective bargaining. The importance of collective wage agreements has
made wage bargaining models to become a workhorse of labour economics.1
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1The database EconLit gives 1648 hits for the search combination ”Unemployment and
Unions or Wage Bargaining”.2
The standard model of collective bargaining, see Cahuc and Zylberberg
(2004), analyses a situation in which the ﬁrm and a union (representing some
exogenous membership) bargain the wage. Subsequently the ﬁrm unilaterally
chooses employment. As a result, the wage will increase in case of wage
bargaining and (ﬁrm-level) employment will decrease. This labour contract
is characterised by two features.
First, the contract described by the standard model is ineﬃcient, see
Leontief (1946). If bargaining is over wages and employment, the collective
agreement could result in a Pareto improvement. This argument, however,
has been questioned since we hardly observe bargaining over employment,
see Oswald (1993).2
Second, the standard view implies that employment can easily be adjusted
which dictates the timing of ”ex-ante” bargaining. In highly regulated labour
markets with substantial ﬁring costs employment cannot be adjusted that
quickly. Thus, there is a case for reversed timing, i.e. the ﬁrm chooses
employment before the bargain takes place (”ex-post” bargaining).
In an innovative paper, Stole and Zwiebel (1996) analyse a model in which
individuals and the ﬁrm bargain the wage after the employment choice of the
ﬁrm. With ”ex-post” bargaining, there will be overemployment compared to
the neoclassical wage taking case. Their argument is that the ﬁrm uses
hiring as a strategic device to dampen the individually bargained wage. This
ﬁnding questions the results derived from the standard model of collective
bargaining.
In this paper we take up the Stole and Zwiebel (1996) argument and ap-
ply it to a collective bargaining environment.3 We analyse the labour market
eﬀects of collective bargaining for diﬀerent sequences of wage bargaining and
employment decisions. With ”ex-ante” bargaining the collective agreement
gives rise to unemployment and ineﬃcient work contracts. These ineﬃcien-
cies can be circumvented by implementing ”ex-post” bargaining. This oﬀers
the ﬁrm a strategic advantage since it can use its employment choice to de-
crease wage demands. The economy will realise an eﬃcient contract in this
2Oswald (1993) shows that as long as the union only cares for wage increases, bargained
contracts which will be on the labour demand curve are eﬃcient. The assumption that
unions do not care for employment, however, seems to be at odds with the data, see Booth
(1995).
3Another recent application of this framework is in Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) who
analyse the eﬀect of strategic employment choices in a search model of unemployment.
Similar to Stole and Zwiebel (1996), they consider individual bargaining.3
setting although we assume right-to-manage. Ex-post bargaining replicates
the case of bargaining over wage and employment without dropping the as-
sumption of unilateral employment choice of the ﬁrm.
These results suggest that the institutional setting of the bargain are
important for the wage and the employment eﬀects of collective bargaining.
Results derived in the ”ex-ante” bargaining environment may turn out wrong
once the timing of the bargain is changed.
2 Framework
Firms in the economy produce homogenous output using labour L according
to the following production function:
x = L
α 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
A union covers the exogenously given membership ¯ L and bargains the wage
w with the ﬁrm such that the utility function
U = Lw + (¯ L − L)B
is maximised. B is the monetarised value of not working. It could be in-
terpreted as some unemployment beneﬁt or as the value of leisure. In any
case, no worker would work for a wage which is smaller than B, thus in an
equilibrium w ≥ B must always hold.4
To determine the bargained wage and the associated employment, we
consider two diﬀerent bargaining scenarios which only diﬀer in the timing of
the employment decision of the ﬁrm (which is always unilateral, since we only
consider right-to-manage) and the wage bargain between union and ﬁrm.
• Scenario 1: Union and ﬁrm ﬁrst bargain the wage. After the wage
agreement, the ﬁrm chooses employment such as to maximise proﬁts.
This is the standard scenario applied in the literature on the eﬀects of
union wage bargaining.
4Since we only consider the partial equilibrium eﬀects of ex-ante and ex-post bargaining,
we do not attempt to endogenise this monetarised value in order to analyse the aggregate
eﬀects. We are well aware of the fact that our results do not necessarily hold for the
aggregate equilibrium, see Layard and Nickell (1990).4
• Scenario 2: The ﬁrm chooses employment. After this choice, the union
and the ﬁrm bargain the wage. However, the ﬁrm is able to lay-oﬀ
all workers in case the bargain fails. This is a novel framework, ﬁrst
analysed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996). Here, it is applied to union wage
bargaining.
The scenarios reﬂect diﬀerent economic environments in which wage bar-
gaining takes place. They diﬀer by the degree of the bindingness of the
employment choice and the bargained wage, respectively. Scenario 1 stands
for a situation in which the economy is characterised by binding wage agree-
ments, but an otherwise ﬂexible labour market in which the ﬁrm can adjust
the stock of employment instantaneously. If however adjusting employment
is very costly (for example due to some form of employment protection leg-
islation), Scenario 2 will be a better description of this economy. Note that
in this case wage (re)negotiations take place after the employment choice of
the ﬁrm which is binding5, at least when an agreement is reached.
Note that if in Scenario 2 the ﬁrm was able to (partially) adjust its labour
force (for example due to a less strict employment protection legislation) after
a wage agreement was reached, Scenario 2 would collaps to Scenario 1. In
this case there would be no diﬀerence in the strategic environment between
the two bargaining games. With the possibility of employment readjustment,
the ﬁrm would not be able to use the employment choice as a strategic device
for the bargaining game.6
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Scenario 1
At the last stage the ﬁrm chooses employment given any bargained wage. By
standard proﬁt maximisation, labour demand reads:
w = αL
α−1, (3.1)
where we assume x to be the num´ eraire. At the ﬁrst stage of the game, the
wage is bargained. During the bargain both parties anticipate the results
5In this case, as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996), the wage is non-binding and is possible
subject to renegotiation.
6I am grateful to the referee for this point.5
of the last stage of the game (i.e. labour demand). The bargained wage is
found by applying the Nash bargaining solution. The Nash product reads:
Ω1 = (L(w)w + (¯ L − L(w))B − ¯ LB)
β(Π(L(w),w) − Π(0))
1−β,
where the outside option of the union is the value of unemployment times
the exogenous membership. That of the ﬁrm is the proﬁt when no worker
is employed (which implies Π(0) = 0). The ﬁrst-order condition for the
bargained wage reads:
















Applying the envelope theorem to the proﬁt function and using the labour










which says that the wage will be a mark-up over the unemployment value B.
Using equations (3.1) and (3.2), we can solve for the equilibrium wage and
equilibrium employment. The union wage bargaining results in higher wages
and lower employment compared to the perfectly competitive situation in
which w = B holds. This is the standard result from the union bargaining
literature.
Denote the equilibrium wage of this scenario by w1, the (equilibrium)









Again the equilibrium is found by backward induction. However, in this
scenario, the wage bargain takes place at the last stage. The Nash product
reads:
Ω2 = (Lw + (¯ L − L)B − ¯ LB)
β(Π(L,w) − Π(0))
1−β. (3.4)
In this scenario employment is not a function of the wage since it is predeter-
mined at the ﬁrst stage. The ﬁrm calls in workers at the ﬁrst stage, employs6
them and bargains the wage after this employment contract. If there is an
agreement over the wage, the ﬁrm employs all the workers that have been
called in at the ﬁrst stage. Thus, the employment contract is binding in the
sense that the ﬁrm cannot unilaterally deviate from this contract when a
wage agreement has been reached. However, when there is no wage agree-
ment, the ﬁrm can lay oﬀ all its employed workers.7 This gives rise to what
Stole and Zwiebel (1996) call a labour hold-up. As is the case in Grout (1984)
who analyses the capital hold-up case, the hold-up situation in our model has
interesting implications for wages and employment in the unionised economy.
The bargained wage in this situation reads:
w = βL
α−1 + (1 − β)B. (3.5)
The wage is a weighted average of the average product of a worker and the
unemployment value B. The weights are the bargaining power of the union
and of the ﬁrm, respectively. The important diﬀerence between the bargained
wage in scenario 1 and 2 is that it is a function of employment in the latter
case which is due to the assumed timing structure. Note, however that if
the bargaining power of the union was zero (β = 0), the wage would again
equal the outside option which is obviously true independent of the timing
assumption.
The dependence of the wage on employment has an important implication
for the behaviour of the ﬁrm. The employment choice at the ﬁrst stage aﬀects
the bargained wage at the second stage. By choosing employment, the ﬁrm




and labour demand is given by:
w = (α + (1 − α)β)L
α−1. (3.6)
The marginal gain of employing labour is not only marginal production,
but also the marginal eﬀect on the bargained wage. As such, the marginal
revenue of labour is larger in this case compared to that in scenario 1.
Equilibrium employment in this ”ex-post” bargaining case is hence given
7If this assumption did not hold the ﬁrm could be totally exploited by the union
implying a bargained wage which leaves the ﬁrm with zero proﬁts. It does not seem
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exceeds that of the competitive situation. This contrasts results found in
Stole and Zwiebel (1996). They argue that there will be overemployment
and the bargained wage will be bid down to the outside option (=unem-
ployment value B), see Result 5 in their paper. The diﬀerence in our model
stems from the fact that the ﬁrm faces collective bargaining with a union
once employment has been set. Thus, the threat points in our framework
are diﬀerent from that in Stole and Zwiebel (1996). This restricts the labour
hold-up, implying a higher wage (and lower employment).
Denoting the equilibrium wage (determined by (3.5) and (3.6)) by w2
yields proﬁts in this scenario:








Using equations (3.3) and (3.7) reveals that the scenario 1 proﬁt always
exceeds the scenario 2 proﬁt. Although the scenario 2 ﬁrm can use the
employment choice strategically to decrease the wage it cannot proﬁt from
this strategic advantage. This is obviously due to the fact that the ﬁrm has
to bind itself to use this advantage which increases the hold-up potential
of the union. This basically resembles the overemployment result in Stole
and Zwiebel (1996). Note, however that although proﬁts decrease welfare
increases.
4 Discussion
In the previous section, we have analysed two wage bargaining scenarios
which have two common features. The wage is bargained between a union
and a ﬁrm and the ﬁrm has the right-to-manage in the sense that it can
unilaterally decide on how much labour to employ. The only diﬀerence is
the timing of the wage and employment decision. This small twist, however,
yields very diﬀerent labour market outcomes in terms of bargained wages
and employment. Figure 1 replicates the equilibria in the ﬁrst two scenarios.
The grey curves are the labour demand and the wage setting relation which
determine the equilibrium in the economy with a standard timing assump-
tion. Employment will be L1 and is lower than in the competitive case. The
reason for this employment decrease is the ineﬃciency caused by the timing8
Figure 1: Labour Market Equilibria
of the wage bargain. If we reverse the timing of employment choice and wage
bargaining, the economy will reach a point like 2. Employment will be equal
to that of the competitive situation, but the wage will be larger than B.
So by changing the timing of the wage bargain, the economy experiences an
eﬃciency gain (compared to scenario 1). Where does this gain come from?
Leontief (1946) has shown that contracts such as the one in scenario 1 are
ineﬃcient. Both parties, ﬁrm and union could gain by bargaining wages and
employment, realising an eﬃcient contract. Ex-post bargaining replicates
this bargaining over wages and employment, although we consider a right-to
manage setting. The ﬁrm uses its strategic advantage and chooses employ-
ment such as to maximise the size of the ”pie”. The bargain at the last stage
only determines how the ”pie” is split. This is where the eﬃciency gain comes
from. With the standard timing assumption, the ﬁrm chooses employment
such that only its piece of the ”pie” is maximised. Both strategies have dif-
ferent labour market outcomes. The ex-post bargaining situation will be on a
contract curve (implying eﬃciency) whereas the ex-ante bargaining economy
will be on a neoclassical labour demand curve.
In the previous section, we have discussed that distinguishing between ex-
post and ex-ante bargaining is especially important in a situation in which9
employment protection legislation is very strong or in general ﬁring costs
are very high. Thus, if the economy is characterised by a high-level of ﬁr-
ing frictions, switching from ex-ante to ex-post bargaining would imply an
eﬃciency gain. This is a second best argument: if the labour market was
already distorted by union wage bargaining, an additional distortion (for ex-
ample a strict employment protection) combined with a clever institutional
arrangement could increase welfare. So care should be taken (especially in
a Continental European context) when reforming the labour market. Small
and gradual reforms may even worsen the situation in the economy.
In the Stole and Zwiebel (1996) framework it is shown that the ﬁrm will
want to overemploy compared to the neoclassical case. This is not true in
our setting. This is due to the fact that the bargaining setting is diﬀerent.
First, the ﬁrm can only (re)negotiate with all its workers. Thus, every worker
will get a fraction of the average product. This limits the employee hold-
up. Second, the threat point of the union is much better than that of an
individual worker. This again limits the hold-up. Nevertheless, we observe
overemployment compared to the ex-ante bargaining situation.
5 Concluding Comments
In this paper we show that the wage and employment eﬀects of collective
bargaining depend on the assumption concerning the timing of the wage
bargain relative to the employment choice. Our model suggests that unioni-
sation does not necessarily result in lower (ﬁrm level) employment. Moreover,
it oﬀers a very straightforward way to resolve a puzzle concerning labour
relations. Real world labour contracts are usually characterised by right-to-
manage, although we know that bargaining over employment and wages is
more eﬃcient, see for example Oswald (1993) or McDonald and Solow (1981).
Right-to-manage situations can result in eﬃcient contracts as long as we have
ex-post bargaining, i.e. the ﬁrm uses the employment choice to inﬂuence the
bargained wage.
All results that have been derived only apply to a partial equilibrium situ-
ation. Consequences for aggregate unemployment can not be drawn directly
from these results since they do not necessarily transform to the general
equilibrium which is, for example characterised by endogenous alternative
incomes, see Layard and Nickell (1990). Nevertheless, we think it is a worth-
while research program to analyse the general equilibrium consequences of10
diﬀerent timing assumptions and to investigate the robustness of policy con-
clusions usually drawn from the standard right-to-manage wage bargaining
model. We leave these questions for further research.
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